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FEDERAL SENTENCING POST-BOOKER
Brian R. Gallini & Emily Q. Shults
In hindsight, the groundwork preceding the so-called “landmark” decision in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), invalidating portions of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) was laid long before its issuance. Consider,
for example, the surprising resignation of former United States District Judge John S.
Martin, who told The Associated Press that “Congress is mandating things simply
because they want to show how tough they are on crime with no sense of whether this
makes sense or is meaningful.”2 Shortly thereafter came Justice Kennedy’s address to
the American Bar Association, during which he observed “the compromise that led to
the guidelines led also to an increase in the length of prison terms. We should revisit
this compromise. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines should be revised downward.”3
Other examples abound. In 2004, the non-profit group Families Against
Mandatory Minimums completed a lengthy study of Arizona’s mandatory minimum
sentencing laws and concluded that such laws fuel the prison overcrowding crisis, fill
prisons with non-violent substance abusers, and cost millions of dollars while doing
little to enhance public safety.4 That same year, the American College of Trial Lawyers
compiled an exhaustive critique of the Sentencing Guidelines concluding that they are
“fundamentally flawed.”5 In similar fashion, the CATO Institute published a critique of
federal sentencing in 2002, which likewise concludes that “[i]t is time to scrap the
commission and its Guidelines, and to embark on a new age of moral judgment in
sentencing.”6

1. The Sixth Circuit humorously stated in a recent opinion that “[a]chieving agreement between the
circuit courts and within each circuit on post-Booker issues has, unfortunately, been like trying to herd
bullfrogs into a wheelbarrow.” United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2006).
2. Greg Gittrich, WTC Judge Quits Bench, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 25, 2003, at 26. In connection with
his resignation, Judge Martin also observed that, “[f]or a judge to be deprived of the ability to consider all of
the factors that go into formulating a just sentence is completely at odds with the sentencing philosophy that
has been a hallmark of the American system of justice.” John S. Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31.
3. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Keynote Address at the
American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003).
4. FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, ARIZONA PRISON CRISIS: A CALL FOR SMART ON
CRIME SOLUTIONS (2004), available at http://www.famm.org/Repository/Files/AZbrieffinal13.pdf.
5. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2004: AN
EXPERIMENT THAT HAS FAILED 35 (2004).
6. Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing, POL’Y ANALYSIS (CATO
Institute, Wash. D.C.), Nov. 1, 2002, at 24, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa458.pdf. Perhaps the
truest precursor to the Guidelines’ failure began with Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta v. United States, 488
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The foregoing examples are merely illustrative; the authorities criticizing the
Guidelines are far too many to mention.7 Given this, it was hardly a surprise then that
the Supreme Court took a significant step toward declaring the Guidelines
unconstitutional when it issued Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). In striking
down Washington State’s sentencing guidelines, the Court held that “the relevant
‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding
additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”8 As
a result, the central question immediately became what impact, if any, the Blakely
decision would have on the constitutionality of the Guidelines.9 Predictably, the
judiciary responded with conflicting results; during the interim period after Blakely, but
before Booker, the Sixth Circuit determined that “Blakely does not compel the
conclusion that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment.”10
Conversely, however, the Ninth Circuit found that “there is no principled distinction
between the Washington Sentencing Reform Act at issue in Blakely and the United
States Sentencing Guidelines.”11
The Circuit split was settled on January 12, 2005, when the Supreme Court
concluded that the holding in Blakely applies to the Guidelines.12 The so-called
“remedial” majority opinion further articulated that the Guidelines could no longer
operate as mandatory sentencing rules.13 Instead, according to the Court, the
Guidelines would, going forward, require a sentencing court to consider Guideline
ranges, but permit the court “to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as
well.”14 Under this new regime, a district court’s sentencing determination would be
viewed from the standpoint of reasonableness.15
Courts initially believed that “Booker [was] not an invitation to do business as
usual”16 and, in fact, went so far as to hold that any defendant sentenced pursuant to
U.S. 361 (1989), the decision upholding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission and its
Guidelines. In his scathing dissent, Justice Scalia observed that “the Court errs, in other words, not so much
because it mistakes the degree of commingling, but because it fails to recognize that this case is not about
commingling, but about the creation of a new Branch altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress.” Id. at 427
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (noting some lines drawn by the Guidelines “seem crazy” and “loony”).
7. For an impressive compilation of authorities dissecting and criticizing the Guidelines, see the 177page opinion authored by Chief Judge William Young of the U.S. District Court of the District of
Massachusetts who, before the issuance of Blakely, ruled that the logic of Apprendi and Ring rendered the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional. United States v. Green, 346 F.Supp. 2d 259 (D. Mass. 2004).
8. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Maureen O’Hagan, Lawyers Try to Sort Out Effects of Court Ruling on Sentencing, THE
SEATTLE TIMES, June 26, 2004, at B1, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
localnews/2001966086_judges26m.html; Adam Liptak, Sentencing Decision’s Reach Is Far and Wide, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2004, §1, at 16; David G. Savage, Thousands of Cases in Doubt After Decision on
Sentencing, L. A. TIMES, June 26, 2004, at 15.
10. United States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (subsequent history omitted).
11. United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (subsequent history omitted).
12. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243-44 (2005) (“Any fact (other than a prior conviction)
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea
of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
13. Id. at 245.
14. Id. at 245-46.
15. Id. at 261 (“And in this instance those factors, in addition to the past two decades of appellate
practice in cases involving departures, imply a practical standard of review already familiar to appellate
courts: review for ‘unreasonable[ness].’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(1994 ed.)).
16. United States v. Ranum, 353 F.Supp.2d 984, 987 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (“District courts cannot just add
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mandatory Guidelines constituted plain error in violation of a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights.17 The past year’s post-Booker jurisprudence has, however,
reflected the judiciary’s unshakeable addiction to the Guidelines.18 Indeed, in
contravention of Booker’s expressed intention to have district courts rely almost
exclusively on jury fact-finding,19 appellate courts now consistently divest the
discretion otherwise afforded to sentencing courts by resolving the applicability of
sentencing enhancements,20 and examining so-called “acquitted conduct” to impose a
penalty.21 Perhaps more problematically, appellate courts have seemingly wholly
ignored the inter-relation between the Court’s holding in Booker and its earlier decision
up figures and pick a number within a narrow range. Rather, they must consider all of the applicable factors,
listen carefully to defense and government counsel, and sentence the person before them as an individual.”);
see, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005) (attempting to provide general guidance to
district courts and noting that district courts cannot satisfy their duty to consider the Guidelines by general
reference to them); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 382 & n.5 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that facts
supporting an enhancement existed, such that enhancement could be applied, but leaving it to the district court
as to whether it ought to be applied now that the Guidelines are advisory); United States v. Cano-Silva, 402
F.3d 1031, 1039 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Under Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, and
the district judge will be free to determine whether the defendant is eligible for a minor-participant adjustment
without any concern that the result would compel what the judge considers an unwarranted sentence.”).
17. United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 530 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Because we are convinced that
sentencing Barnett under mandatory Guidelines ‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity [and] public
reputation of judicial proceedings,’ now that we know those Guidelines are advisory, we exercise our
discretion to notice the plain sentencing error in the present case and vacate Barnett's sentence.” (citation
omitted)). But see United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005) (requiring defendants to
demonstrate prejudice from the application of mandatory guidelines (the reasonable probability of a different
outcome) to satisfy the third step of plain-error review).
18. Several circuits now view a district court’s sentence within the Guidelines as per se reasonable. See,
e.g., United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341-44 (4th Cir. 2006) (adopting and exploring justifications for
presumption of reasonableness); Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 (“If the sentencing judge exercises her discretion to
impose a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness review we will infer
that the judge has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in the Guidelines.”); United States v.
Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We now join several sister circuits in crediting sentences
properly calculated under the Guidelines with a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.”); United States v.
Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The best way to express the new balance, in our view, is to
acknowledge that any sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness.”); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[Defendant’s]
sentence . . . was within the guidelines range for his offense level of 38 and criminal history category IV, and
as a result, we think that it is presumptively reasonable.”); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th
Cir. 2006) (“[A] sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption of reasonableness.); United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding
properly calculated Guidelines sentence “ordinarily” will be reasonable). But cf. United States v. Rubenstein,
403 F.3d 93, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2005) (Cardamone, J., concurring) (“Correct application of the Guidelines is but
one factor to be considered under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 in reviewing reasonableness, and it is entirely possible
that a correctly calculated Guidelines sentence might nonetheless be found unreasonable upon consideration
of other factors.” (citation omitted)).
19. 543 U.S. at 244. Although, as the Court observed, “jury factfinding may impair the most expedient
and efficient sentencing of defendants,” the judiciary’s common interest “in fairness and reliability protected
by the right to a jury trial–a common-law right that defendants enjoyed for centuries and that is now enshrined
in the Sixth Amendment–has always outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.” Id.
20. United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 352 (6th Cir. 2005) (Cook, J., concurring) (noting “judges may
enhance sentences based upon facts not found by the jury, provided they do not consider themselves required
to do so”). As discussed more fully below, such a statement of the post-Booker law appears wholly incorrect;
to the extent that judicial fact-finding remains after Booker, it must be preceded by jury involvement or an
admission by the defendant.
21. United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming, notwithstanding Booker,
that “[r]elevant conduct of which a defendant was acquitted nonetheless may be taken into account in
sentencing for the offense of conviction, as long as the government proves the acquitted conduct relied upon
by a preponderance of the evidence” (quoting United States v. Barakat, 130 F.3d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir.
1997)).
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in United States v. Cotton, which held that Apprendi “facts must also be charged in the
indictment.”22
In short, although the post-Booker legal landscape continues to evolve on a daily
basis, the judiciary’s direction points toward some measure of consistency. Part I of
this Article will provide an overview of the history and prevailing motivations behind
the promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Using the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as an illustrative example,23 Part II will contend that,
notwithstanding the supposed “far-reaching” implications of both Blakely and Booker,
the judiciary’s continued reliance on the “advisory” Guidelines has practically changed
federal sentencing procedures very little in form or function. In contrast, Part III
examines the State of Maine’s sentencing scheme and its response to the Supreme
Court’s Booker/Blakely decisions. By arguing that Maine’s sentencing procedure
reflects a commonsense approach to sentencing by affording substantial discretion to
sentencing courts within the confines of a determinate sentencing system, this Article
concludes by advocating a revision to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to reflect a
mixed determinate/indeterminate sentencing system.
The Guidelines, however
carefully crafted, have long been in need of substantial adjustment. This Article
proffers that, rather than insisting upon their immutability, federal sentencing would do
well to reflect upon its own history, and the evolution of its state counterparts. After all,
“little inconveniences in the forms of justice... are the price that all free nations must
pay for their liberty in more substantial matters....”24
I.
The present muddled state of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, culminating in the
milestone decisions of Booker and Blakely, has a long and subtle history. This section
does not purport to serve as a comprehensive guide, but instead attempts to provide an
overview of the competing philosophies and concerns that have influenced the
evolution of federal procedure.25 The recitation of the broad history of federal
sentencing, contrasted with the relatively short history of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, bolsters the case for viewing the federal sentencing structure as an
improving continuum, not an immutable scheme. As such, improvements are still to
come, and, as this Article later suggests, federal sentencing would be wise to look to its
state counterparts for alternatives and potential improvements to the Guidelines.
A. An Overview of Early Sentencing
In the early stages of federal sentencing, judges possessed wide discretion in the

22. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002). Thus, not only must all facts increasing the
Guidelines range for the offense of conviction be submitted to the jury or admitted by the defendant, they
must also be charged by the grand jury in the indictment. Id.
23. Significantly, a leading academic chronicler of sentencing decisions believes “the Sixth Circuit is
doing some of the best post-Booker work of any of the circuits.” Douglas A. Berman, Strong Booker work
from the Sixth Circuit, Sentencing Law and Policy, May 26, 2006, http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2006/week21/index.html/.
24. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (quoting 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343-344 (1769)).
25. For a more comprehensive chronicle, see SANDRA SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM IN
THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT (1985).
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imposing of sentences.26 For nearly two hundred years, minimal appellate review of
sentencing judges’ determinations existed.27 This broad entrustment of sentencing
discretion was a product of the termed “rehabilitative ideal” philosophy of sentencing.28
The approach was based on the “concepts of the offender’s possible, indeed probable,
rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate and
thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal activity upon his return to
society.”29 Thus, sentencing judges and parole officers “were in positions to exercise,
and usually did exercise, very broad discretion.”30
The rehabilitative motivations fueling the broad discretion afforded to sentencing
judges was particularly evident in the Supreme Court’s Williams v. New York
decision.31 There, the Court reviewed a trial court’s sentence of death, despite a jury’s
recommendation of life imprisonment, based upon information about the defendant that
was not presented at trial but, instead, was contained within a pre-sentence report.32
Defendant contended that he had a right to confront and cross-examine information
derived from prosecution witnesses considered in the sentencing evaluation; the Court
disagreed.33 Affirming both the conviction and sentence, the Supreme Court
distinguished the procedural regulations required for determining guilt from the
procedural regulations governing sentencing, noting the latter was “[h]ighly relevant–If
not essential–to [the sentencing judge’s] selection of an appropriate sentence [because
sentencing judges could possess] the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant’s life and characteristics.”34 Thus, “modern concepts individualizing
punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied
an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to
restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial.”35 This concept of
“individualiz[ed] punishment” worked in tandem with “the belief that by careful study
of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders many could be less severely
punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful citizenship”36–a

26. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)/
For almost a century, the Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system of
indeterminate sentencing[,] . . . [which] nearly always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion to
decide whether the offender should be incarcerated and for how long, whether he should be fined
and how much, and whether some lesser restraint, such as probation, should be imposed instead of
imprisonment or fine.
27. See United States v. Wynn, 11 F. 57 (E.D. Mo. 1882); see also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 223, 226 n.8 (1993) (discussing the lack of appellate review excepting a “brief period in the
late 19th Century[,]” during which a federal provision was interpreted to permit “appellate courts to consider
not only whether the sentence imposed was lawful–within statutory limitations–but also whether it was
excessive, and, if so, to modify it”).
28. See Douglas A. Berman, Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pondering Modern Sentencing Process, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 654-55 (2005) (discussing medical origins of “rehabilitative ideal,” which
viewed the offender as a “sick” individual who might be “cured”).
29. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363.
30. Id.
31. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
32. Id. at 242-44.
33. Id. at 245-48.
34. Id. at 247.
35. Id.
36. Williams, 337 U.S. at 249.
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sentiment nothing short of the rehabilitative ideal.37
B. Reform
Beginning in the 1950s, and continuing throughout the 60s and 70s, criminal justice
researchers and scholars began to voice concerns about the indeterminate sentencing
structure.38 Critics pointed to three fundamental concerns: (1) the lack of success in
accomplishing rehabilitative goals; (2) anxiety among prisoners resulting from
uncertainty and disparity in sentencing; and (3) the conceptual discrepancy between the
ideals of equality and the rule of law, exemplified by “unwarranted disparities”–such as
racial bias–in sentence length.39 Perhaps the most vocal critic of the indeterminate
sentence structure was Judge Marvin Frankel, who published a plethora of scholarship
lambasting indeterminate sentencing as a system in which judges were “[s]ubject
essentially to no law.”40 Simultaneously, concerns about rising crime rates inspired
advocates of tougher criminal penalties to support calls for sentencing reform.41
Following revisions in several states,42 the federal government initiated changes in
sentencing procedures with the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the
“Act”),43 thereby creating the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which in turn promulgated
the Guidelines. Unlike the rehabilitative motivations that buoyed indeterminate
sentencing, the Guidelines did not align itself with any one penal ideology.44 On the
contrary, the preceding bills and the final Guidelines listed four generally accepted
justifications “to be considered” for criminal sentencing by the sentencing court 45
These justifications–retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation–were
proffered without any further guidance as to the amount of weight each should be
afforded.46 In retrospect, perhaps the most glaring omission from both of the new
37. For further discussion of the interplay in the following decades between rehabilitative motivations
and constitutional procedure in Supreme Court decisions, see Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker,
38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 388-98 (2006).
38. Stith & Koh, supra note 27, at 227.
39. Id. (citations omitted); see Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895-97 (1990) (highlighting particular incidences
and studies of disparate sentences).
40. Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043,
2044 (1992); see MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1972).
41. J. Edgar Hoover, The Dire Consequences of the Premature Release of Dangerous Criminals Through
Probation and Parole, 27 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1 (1958).
42. Minnesota created a Sentencing Guidelines Commission in 1978. See RICHARD S. FRASE,
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN MINNESOTA, 1978-2003 (Michael Tonry ed., University of Chicago Press 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=623281. Pennsylvania and Washington soon followed suit. See 204 PA.
CODE § 303 (1982) (codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (West 1982)); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.94A.040 (West 1988).
43. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
44. For a more detailed discussion of penal philosophies within the Sentencing Reform Act’s legislative
history, see Stith & Koh, supra note 27, at 239. See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2000) (outlining the duties of the
Sentencing Commission and specifically rejecting rehabilitation as a goal of imprisonment).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
46. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553 requires that the sentencing court consider, inter alia, the following factors:
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
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substantive state and federal sentencing laws was the lack of procedural provisions
which would provide form to the newly announced substance.47 The Act did not set
forth, or even mention, a requisite sentencing procedure, save for a few passing
comments,48 largely rendered moot by existing statutory law.49
In the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court dealt with a direct constitutional challenge to
the revised sentencing guidelines in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.50 The criminal
defendants in McMillan challenged Pennsylvania’s sentencing guidelines, enacted in
1982, which imposed a five-year mandatory minimum sentence if a judge found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the criminal defendant “visibly possessed a
firearm” during the commission of enumerated offenses.51 In upholding the guideline,
the McMillan Court concluded that “States may treat ‘visible possession of a firearm’ as
a sentencing consideration rather than an element of a particular offense,” without any
heightened burden of proof.52 The Court further relied upon Williams, which
constitutionally blessed judicial discretion, for the proposition that, “[s]entencing courts
have traditionally heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden of
proof at all.”53 Yet despite this seemingly binding precedent, the conceptual
motivations underpinning Williams were not present in McMillan. Professor Douglas
A. Berman aptly notes that, contrary to the rehabilitative threads which infused the
Williams decision and purportedly justified broad judicial discretion, the mandatory
minimum sentence in Pennsylvania was promulgated with the specified goals of
“protect[ing] the public from armed criminals and... deter[ring] violent crime... as well
as to... punish[ ] those who commit serious crimes with guns.”54
The constitutional approval of determinate sentencing crested with the Supreme
Court’s 1997 decision, United States v. Watts.55 There, again relying on Williams, the
Court upheld a federal guideline requiring an increase in the criminal defendant’s
sentence if the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had
committed certain underlying charges, even if the defendant was acquitted.56 In his
dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s reliance on Williams, noting that “its
rationale depended largely on agreement with an individualized sentencing regime that
is significantly different from the Guidelines system.”57 Moreover, according to Justice

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
47. Professor Berman contends that the lack of procedural guidance in state and federal sentencing
guidelines immediately resulted in conceptual chaos. Berman, supra note 28, at 659-61.
48. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (1992) (providing that Federal Rules
of Evidence would not apply at sentencing proceedings; information was permissible providing that there was
“sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy”).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”).
50. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
51. Id. at 81-82 & n.1.
52. Id. at 91.
53. Id. (citing Willams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)).
54. Berman, supra note 28, at 664 (quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 494 A.2d 354, 362 (Pa. 1985)).
55. 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
56. Id. at 156.
57. Id. at 165 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Stevens, “[t]he goals of rehabilitation and fairness served by individualized sentencing
that formerly justified vesting judges with virtually unreviewable sentencing discretion
have been replaced by the impersonal interest in uniformity and retribution.”58
C .The Fall
Post-Watts, determinate sentencing was not without its share of academic critics,
yet it nevertheless appeared to have achieved a measure of legal permanence stemming
from the foregoing constitutional sanctions.59 The Supreme Court had repeatedly relied
upon judicial discretion as a justification for tolerating the loose procedural form of
sentencing guidelines, but had not conceptualized the effect the substantive change of
the Guidelines would have on that discretion. Then, twelve years after Watts, the
Supreme Court undertook Almendarez-Torres v. United States60 and Jones v. United
States,61 cases in which several of the Justices expressed doubts about the constitutional
viability of judge-determined sentencing procedures. Both cases involved the
Guidelines’ potential for sentence enhancements resulting from judge-found facts–prior
convictions and “resulting bodily injury–respectively.62 In holding that the contested
guideline was constitutional in Almendarez-Torres and unconstitutional in Jones, the
Court focused its analysis on the text of the applicable statutes; namely, whether the
judge-found fact constituted an element of the crime or a sentencing factor.63
Ultimately, the Court avoided confronting the issue in Jones by emphasizing that it was
not adopting a constitutional rule, but merely interpreting “a particular federal statute in
light of a set of constitutional concerns.”64
Both the Almendarez-Torres and Jones Courts foreshadowed a shift in the
constitutional treatment of determinate sentencing procedures. One year later, a sharply
divided Court struggled to reconcile its divergent ideologies when a state defendant
challenged a New Jersey statute providing that his sentence could be enhanced if the
sentencing court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]he defendant in
committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of
individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or
ethnicity.”65 Deeming the statute unconstitutional, the Court announced: “Other than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.”66 Although today, with the foreknowledge of the Booker/Blakely
decisions, the impact of the rule announced in Apprendi seems broad, the ruling’s
impact was largely contained; lower federal and state courts interpreted the new rule
narrowly, and legislatures failed to take remedial action to alter sentencing guidelines

58. Id. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. See generally Berman, supra note 28, at 670.
60. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
61. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
62. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27; Jones, 526 U.S. at 232-39.
63. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27; Jones, 526 U.S. at 232-39.
64. Id. at 251 n.11.
65. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468-69 (2000) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West
Supp. 1999-2000)).
66. Id. at 490.
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and recommendations.67 Determinate sentencing became the programmatic, and
somewhat enormous, law of the land; perhaps fundamental changes seemed too
overwhelming an undertaking.
The biggest shocks were still to come. In Blakely v. Washington, the Court struck
down a provision of the Washington State sentencing guidelines enhancing a
defendant’s sentence based on the judge-found fact that the defendant’s criminal
kidnapping involved “deliberate cruelty.”68 In a decision which echoed the concerns of
Justice Stevens in Watts, Blakely stated that “[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that
the jury’s verdict does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law
makes essential to the punishment,’ and the judge exceeds his authority.”69 Although
the Court stated that it expressed no opinion on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,70 the
Blakely Court cast grave doubt on the vim of determinate sentencing legislation
nationwide. Following the Blakely decision, federal district and circuit courts viewed
the continuing vitality of the Guidelines with some skepticism and, according to a report
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, “no longer uniformly applied the sentencing
guidelines.”71
The other shoe dropped soon thereafter. Although the Court’s audience anticipated
the expansion of Blakely with the grant of expedited review in United States v. Booker72
and United States v. Fanfan,73 they were unprepared for the Court’s choice of remedy.
Arguably, the holding in Blakely foreshadowed a larger role for juries in sentencing
procedures by ensuring that all facts capable of enhancing a defendant’s final sentence
were, in fact, proven beyond a reasonable doubt.74 The Booker Court even observed
that Sixth Amendment jurisprudence “forced the Court to address the question of how
the right to jury trial could be preserved, in a meaningful way guaranteeing that the jury
would still stand between the individual and the power of the government under the new
sentencing regime.”75 Yet instead of increasing the role of the jury in determinate
sentencing, the piecemeal five-Justice Booker majority remedied the constitutional
infractions present in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines by invalidating the mandatory
nature of the scheme, thereby making it wholly advisory.76
D. Current Sentencing Procedure
The current state of determinate sentencing pursuant to the Guidelines is an
evolving enigma. Part II will proffer that, in reality, the tide of Booker’s potential
impact has largely been stemmed, perhaps even completely dammed, by the narrow

67. See Stephanos Bibas, Apprendi in the States: The Virtues of Federalism as a Structural Limit on
Errors, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2003) (detailing the limited effect Apprendi had on a variety of
areas in the criminal sentencing process).
68. 542 U.S. 296, 298, 305 (2004).
69. Id. at 304 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 304 n.9.
71. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 12 (2006), http://www.ussc.gov/booker_report/Booker_Report.pdf.
72. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
73. 542 U.S. 956 (2004).
74. See Berman, supra note 28, 675-76.
75. Booker, 543 U.S. at 237.
76. Id. at 222.
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judicial application of Booker’s holding. Post-Booker jurisprudence has molded a
“new” sentencing procedure that has reached some measure of rote consistency.
Booker instructs that “[t]he district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines,
must consult those guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”77 Thus,
the calculation of the would-be mandatory guideline range is still the first step in any
sentencing assessment.78 Tellingly, the Fourth Circuit noted that in most post-Booker
cases, “a district court will calculate, consult, and take into account the exact same
guideline range that it would have applied under the pre-Booker mandatory guidelines
regime.”79 Indeed, the “guideline range remains the starting point for the sentencing
decision. And, if the district court decides to impose a sentence outside that range, it
should explain its reasons for doing so.”80
The calculation of this “advisory” range remains rife with judicial fact-finding.
While holding the Guidelines scheme unconstitutional, Booker’s remedy nonetheless
purported to “maintain[] a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the
offender’s real conduct–a connection important to the increased uniformity of
sentencing that Congress intended its Guidelines system to achieve.”81 The U.S.
Sentencing Commission and subsequent circuit case law have interpreted this guidance
as validation of judicial fact-finding with regard to a defendant’s relevant conduct.82
Indeed, although defendants have protested, arguing that Booker required any disputed
fact to be submitted to a jury, the circuits have now nearly unanimously held that
Booker only proscribes judicial fact-finding that increases a defendant’s sentence above

77. Id. at 264.
78. See United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 525 (2d Cir. 2005) (“District courts remain statutorily
obliged to calculate guidelines ranges in the same manner as before Booker and to find facts relevant to
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence”); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005)
(noting that ordinarily, the sentencing judge must determine the applicable guidelines range in the same
manner as before Booker; this process includes finding all facts relevant to sentencing using a preponderance
of the evidence standard); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2005) (“District courts . . . must,
therefore, calculate the Guideline range as they would have done prior to Booker . . . .”); United States v.
Rodriguez-Alvarez, 425 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Sentencing courts must continue to calculate the
applicable guidelines range even though the guidelines are now advisory.”).
79. United States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 263-64).
80. Id. (internal citations omitted).
81. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246.
82. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 71, at 21 n.150 (citing the Guidelines
Manual, §1B1.3 (2005) (enumerating the variety of determinations that are still within the province of a
sentencing court)). Specifically, the Commission observes that the Guidelines provide that the defendant’s
offense level shall be determined on the basis of the following:
(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal
activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert
with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions
of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense; (2) solely with respect to offenses
of a character for which USSG §3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and
omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part of the same course of
conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction; (3) all harm that resulted from the
acts and omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the
object of such acts and omissions; and (4) any other information specified in the applicable
guideline.
Id.
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the statutory maximum.83 In a recent case, the Sixth Circuit succinctly stated: “Booker
did not eliminate judicial fact-finding. Instead, the remedial majority gave district
courts the option, after calculating the Guideline range, to sentence a defendant outside
the resulting Guideline range.”84
II.
Bearing the foregoing characterization in mind, Part II will examine the changed
aspects of sentencing as exemplified by the Sixth Circuit. Although the court candidly
acknowledged that “[a]chieving agreement between the circuit courts and within each
circuit on post-Booker issues has, unfortunately, been like trying to herd bullfrogs into a
wheelbarrow[,]”85 the Sixth Circuit has proved to be at the forefront of Booker
jurisprudence,86 and its disposition of Booker issues provides insight into the larger
direction of the judiciary. Through the specific examples of judicial fact-finding in the
calculation of the Guidelines, the uniform approval of “shadow” sentences, the
“rebuttable presumption of reasonableness” within Guidelines sentences, and Booker’s
general effect on sentencing factors, Part II will demonstrate how the realities of postBooker application have dwarfed the potential impact of Booker and the promise of
increased judicial discretion.
A. Judicial Fact-Finding in Guidelines’ Calculations
Shortly after the issuance of Booker, the Sixth Circuit issued a flurry of cases
attempting to distill its application to judicial fact-finding at sentencing. In one of its
earliest cases, United States v. Oliver,87 the circuit held that the district court
erroneously imposed a sentence exceeding the maximum Guidelines’ range “based
upon judge-found fact” and the pre-Booker sentencing Guidelines.88 Although the
defendant in Oliver was sentenced pursuant to the mandatory Guidelines, the spirit of
Oliver did not seem constricted to stake its holding on this narrower point, stating: “A
sentencing error that leads to a violation of the Sixth Amendment by imposing a more
severe sentence than is supported by the jury verdict ‘would diminish the integrity and
public reputation of the judicial system [and] also would diminish the fairness of the

83. See, e.g., United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Vaughn, 430
F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Sander, 178 F.App’x 221, 223 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 898 (6th Cir. 2006); McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 481
(7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 551 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States v.
Dare, 425 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kelly, 159 F.App’x 864, 867-68 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 769
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
84. Coffee, 434 F.3d at 898.
85. United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2006).
86. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. See also As the Sixth Circuit Booker World Turns,
Appellate
Law
&
Practice
Blog,
(Feb.
17,
2005),
http://appellate.typepad.com/appellate/2005/02/as_the_sixth_ci.html#more/.
87. 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir 2005).
88. Id. at 378 (“Given this extension of the length of Oliver’s sentence beyond that supported by the facts
determined by the jury, we must conclude that the district court’s sentencing determination violated the Sixth
Amendment.”).
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criminal sentencing system.’”89
Although the spirit of Oliver seemingly intimated the circuit’s complete
disapproval of judge-found facts in post-Booker sentencing, subsequent cases narrowed
Oliver’s sentiments significantly. The Sixth Circuit quickly adopted an expansive
notion of what comprised “facts admitted by the defendant.”90 At the outset, the court
held that facts stipulated in plea agreements comprised admissions by defendants.91
The court then concluded that facts included in the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), and
not objected to by the defendant, constituted admitted facts for sentencing purposes.92
The propriety of independent judicial fact-finding, however, remained in doubt.
Initially, in United States v. Davis, the Sixth Circuit condemned post-Booker judgefound facts by holding that “the district court did exactly what the Supreme Court found
to be a violation of the Sixth Amendment in Booker: the district court engaged in
independent fact-finding which enhanced Defendant’s sentence beyond the facts
established by the jury verdict or admitted by Defendant.”93 The tide quickly turned
after the issuance of United States v. Davidson,94 wherein the Sixth Circuit more
directly addressed whether sentencing courts may independently find facts to enhance a
defendant’s sentence pursuant to the Guidelines.
In Davidson, two defendants appealed their convictions on the basis of guilty pleas
to the attempted manufacture of narcotics and possession of a stolen vehicle.95 The
defendants specifically challenged the district court’s imposition of a firearm
enhancement to lengthen their sentence based on facts that were neither admitted by the
defendants, nor found by the jury.96 At the outset of its analysis, the Davidson court
acknowledged that “absent the judicial findings that Mrs. Davidson possessed a firearm
in connection with the attempt to manufacture methamphetamine... Mrs. Davidson’s
sentencing range would have been substantially lower.”97 Although the court
correspondingly recognized Booker’s express prohibition against the imposition of

89. Id. at 380 (quoting United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir. 2004)). For other early Sixth
Circuit interpretations of Booker, see United States v. Smith, 404 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (6th Cir. 2005). See
also United States v. Merkosky, 135 F.App’x 828, 836-37 (6th Cir. 2005).
90. United States v. Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 501 (6th Cir. 2005).
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Adkins, 429 F.3d 631, 633 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that when defendant
explicitly declines to object to PSR, conduct is deemed admitted for sentencing purposes); United States v.
Roper, 266 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding defendant’s withdrawal of objection and stipulation to drug
quantity in PSR provided requisite factual basis for enhanced sentence); United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d 638,
648 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding defendant’s statement that he had no objections to the PSR constitutes an express
admission of the amount and type of drugs attributed to the defendant in the report); United States v. Loggins,
136 F.App’x 789, 793 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Because the district court did not base the Defendant’s sentence on
any fact other than that which the Defendant admitted here (by not objecting to the presentence report), the
Defendant’s sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment.”); United States v. Clements, 142 F.App’x 223,
228-229 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Stafford, 258 F.3d 465, 476 (6th Cir. 2001)) (holding that
defendant’s withdrawal of his objection to drug quantities in PSR operated as an admission); United States v.
Harris, 132 F.App’x 46, 49 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding defendant was deemed to have admitted that his crime
involved three firearms where he failed to object to inclusion of this fact in PSR).
93. United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 2005). Note, however, the language of the
concurring opinion, rhetoric that ultimately became the prevailing law governing the propriety of judicial factfinding. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
94. 409 F.3d 304 (6th Cir. 2005).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 309.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
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sentences based on such unconstitutional judicial fact-finding, it nonetheless went on to
review the propriety of the facts found by the district court to support its utilization of
the firearm enhancement.98 In doing so, the court quizzically stated that, “for purposes
of determining the Guidelines recommendation, we continue to accept a district court’s
factual finding that a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug crime unless it is
clearly erroneous.”99 Thus, the court concluded, for purposes of determining a “nonmandatory Guidelines recommendation,” it would not be error for the district court to
impose a guideline-specified “Firearm Enhancement” to defendants’ sentences on
remand.100
In keeping with the rationale of Davidson, the Sixth Circuit now routinely approves
of judicial fact-finding in sentencing; indeed, district courts “must... calculate the
Guideline range as they would have done prior to Booker.”101 Sentencing courts may
still consider reliable hearsay in calculating the advisory Guidelines sentence.102
Likewise, sentencing courts may consider uncharged or acquitted conduct in fashioning
the defendant’s appropriate Guidelines range, so long as the resulting sentence does not
exceed the statutory maximum sentence.103 Thus, to the extent that Booker impacted
independent judicial fact-finding at sentencing, it did so only inasmuch as to require the
sentencing court to acknowledge that the Guidelines are now advisory, not mandatory.
B. Shadow Sentences
In discerning what factors sufficiently reflected the sentencing court’s awareness of
the “advisory” status of the Guidelines, the Sixth Circuit quickly approved the
constitutionality of so-called “shadow” sentences–preventative tactic employed by
district courts in the months following Blakely and leading up to Booker. As a general
rule, the Sixth Circuit vacated sentences imposed pursuant to a sentencing court’s belief
that the Guidelines provided a mandatory sentencing scheme.104 A handful of crafty
and forward-thinking pre-Booker sentencing courts, however, issued two sentences: one
sentence if the Guidelines were upheld as constitutional and another “shadow” sentence
in case the Supreme Court found the Guidelines unconstitutional.
In United States v. Christopher, the Sixth Circuit considered the propriety of
issuing these alternative “shadow” sentences.105 In Christopher, the district court first
adopted the pre-sentence report’s offense level and loss calculations, and then issued
two identical sentences–one treating the Guidelines as a mandatory sentencing scheme

98. Id. at 310.
99. Davidson,409 F.3d at 310 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 599 (6th
Cir. 2003).
100. Id. at 312-13.
101. Coffee, 434 F.3d at 898; cf. United States v. Williams, 411 F.3d 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2005).
102. United States v. Katzopoulos, 437 F.3d 569, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the admission of
reliable hearsay at sentencing did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights).
103. See United States v. Vaught, 133 F. App’x 229, 233 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The United States need not
charge and convict the defendant with the ‘other’ offense; it need only prove the facts supporting the greater
charge by a preponderance of the evidence.”); United States v. Hopson, No. 05-3253, 2006 WL 1913414, at
*1 n.3 (6th Cir. June 11, 2006) (unpublished).
104. Oliver, 397 F.3d at 378; cf. United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 526-30 (6th Cir. 2005); Loggins,
136 F.App’x at 793 (6th Cir. 2005).
105. United States v. Christopher, 415 F.3d 590, 592 (6th Cir. 2005).
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and the other applying § 3553(a) as the governing statute.106 Affirming the practice, the
Sixth Circuit concluded “that when a district court imposes alternative, identical
sentences, one under a regime in which Guidelines enhancements are not mandatory,
the harmlessness of any Booker error is established.”107
This blanket acceptance of a district court’s alternative sentencing declaration
epitomizes the Sixth Circuit’s desire for a “quick-fix” to the problems created by
Booker. Although, as discussed below, specific standards facilitate the reviewing
court’s determination of whether a defendant’s sentence is “reasonable,” condoning the
use of “shadow” sentences improperly invites that court to accept sentences devoid of
any analysis from the sentencing court.108
C. Reasonableness Review
The Sixth Circuit has acceded in a recent opinion that post-Booker, “we, along with
the rest of the federal appellate system, have struggled to define the meaning of
reasonableness review for sentencing purposes.”109 Pursuant to Booker’s instruction,
the court concluded that, “when a defendant challenges a district court’s sentencing
determination, [it is] instructed to determine ‘whether [the] sentence is
unreasonable.’”110 Accordingly, the circuit has separated reasonableness challenges
into two arguments: (1) procedural unreasonableness (i.e. the failure of a court to
adequately consider the sentencing factors enumerated by § 3553(a)); and (2) the
unreasonableness of the sentence imposed (i.e. the district court placed undue weight on
one particular factor, which resulted in an unreasonable sentence).111
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553 governs both forms of reasonableness review.112 Pursuant
to § 3553(a), a sentencing court must consider:
(1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant;” (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the
appropriate advisory guideline range; (5) any other pertinent policy statement issued
by the Sentencing Commission; (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct; and” (7) “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the

106. Id. at 592-93.
107. Id. at 593 (citing United States v. Strbac, 129 F.App’x 235, 237 (6th Cir. 2005)). Accord, e.g.,
United States v. Hill, 411 F.3d 425, 426 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 482 (7th Cir.
2005); United States v. Thompson, 403 F.3d 533, 535 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Serrano-Dominguez,
406 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Anderson, 124 F.App’x 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2005).
108. See generally United States v. Wilson, 438 F.3d 672, 675 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cheney,
183 F.App’x 516, 516-17 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Johnson, 184 F.App’x 498, 501-02 (6th Cir. 2006).
109. United States v. Vonner, 452 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2006).
110. United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 261 (2005)) (third alteration in original), cert. denied, – U.S. – , 126 S.Ct. 1110 (2006).
111. See United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006).
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
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offense.”

A sentencing court is charged with the careful consideration of the aforementioned
factors to ultimately produce “a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in [the provision].”114
In two early post-Booker cases, United States v. Webb and United States v.
Jackson, the Sixth Circuit attempted to establish the parameters of reasonableness
review pursuant to the advisory Guidelines.115
Both cases emphasized the
comprehensive nature of the § 3553(a) factors; the Webb court specifically stated:
[W]e read Booker as instructing appellate courts in determining reasonableness to
consider not only the length of the sentence but also the factors evaluated and the
procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determination.
Thus, we may conclude that a sentence is unreasonable when the district judge fails
to ‘consider’ the applicable Guidelines range or neglects to ‘consider’ the other
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and instead simply selects what the judge deems
116
an appropriate sentence without such required consideration.

The circuit was, however, quick to emphasize that although a district court’s
discussion of specific § 3553(a) factors facilitates appellate review, “[the Sixth Circuit]
has never required the ‘ritual incantation’ of the factors to affirm a sentence.”117
Instead, the circuit reviews challenges for procedural unreasonableness on a case-bycase basis,118 during which it must be capable of engaging “in a meaningful
reasonableness review of federal criminal sentences in accordance with Booker.”119
Although § 3553 lists several factors, the factor that undoubtedly still carries the
most weight is the advisory Guidelines range.120 Indeed, in United States v.
Williams,121 the circuit “join[ed] several sister circuits in crediting sentences properly
calculated under the Guidelines with a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.”122
113. Vonner, 452 F.3d at 565 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000)).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
115. United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301,
305 (6th Cir. 2005).
116. Webb, 403 F.3d at 383; see Jackson, 408 F.3d at 305 (noting that a mere listing of factors by a
sentencing court is insufficient; “an appellate court must still have the articulation of the reasons the district
court reached the sentence ultimately imposed, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)”). Interestingly, the
district court in Jackson departed downward from the recommended Guidelines range. In vacating
defendant’s sentence, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court did not sufficiently articulate reasons
to justify a downward departure from the Guidelines. Id. at 304-05.
117. United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Washington,
147 F.3d 490, 490 (6th Cir. 1998)); accord, e.g., United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“The court need not recite these factors but must articulate its reasoning in deciding to impose a sentence in
order to allow for reasonable appellate review.”).
118. See United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 643-44 (6th Cir. 2006).
119. Jackson, 408 F.3d at 305.
120. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. After the Sixth Circuit’s Williams decision, however, four
circuits declined to adopt a presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d
514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006); United States
v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Zavala, 443 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006).
121. 436 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2006).
122. Id. at 708. (“Although the Sentencing Guidelines are not mandatory, sentences within the prescribed
range are presumptively reasonable.”) Id. at 708 n.1 (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 134 F. App’x 595, 598
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This, according to Williams, did not obviate the duty of a sentencing court to consider
all of the relevant § 3553(a) factors, although, again, a “ritual incantation” of the factors
remained unnecessary.123 The circuit proceeded to clarify Williams by subsequently
stating in United States v. Foreman that:
Williams does not mean that a sentence outside of the Guidelines range–either higher
or lower–is presumptively unreasonable. It is not. Williams does not mean that a
Guidelines sentence will be found reasonable in the absence of evidence in the record
124
that the district court considered all of the relevant section 3553(a) factors.

Although the Foreman court approved of the presumption of reasonableness afforded to
Guidelines sentences, it also emphasized the importance of a district court’s analysis of
the § 3553(a) factors alongside meaningful appellate review, insisting that the
presumption was not “an excuse for an appellate court to abdicate any semblance of
meaningful review.”125
In United States v. Richardson, the Sixth Circuit continued the expansion of
Williams.126 Reiterating that a sentence within the appropriate advisory Guideline
range should be credited with a presumption of reasonableness, the court stated
nonetheless that:
We emphasize the obligation of the district court in each case to communicate clearly
its rationale for imposing the specific sentence. Where a defendant raises a particular
argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district
judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for
rejecting it. This assures not only that the defendant can understand the basis for the
particular sentence but also that the reviewing court can intelligently determine
127
whether the specific sentence is indeed reasonable.

In United States v. Vonner, the Sixth Circuit restated the procedural principles of
Williams cloaked in even broader language.128 There, the court reviewed a sentence
where:
[t]he only proof in the record of the district court’s consideration is the district court’s
statement that “[w]ith respect to the sentence in this case, the Court has considered

(3d Cir. 2005)); see United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“If the sentencing judge
exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our
reasonableness review we will infer that the judge has considered all the factors for a fair sentence set forth in
the Guidelines.”); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The best way to express the
new balance, in our view, is to acknowledge that any sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines
is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.”); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th
Cir. 2005) (utilizing presumption of reasonableness).
123. Williams, 436 F.3d at 708-09.
124. Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644.
125. Id.
126. United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2006).
127. Id. at 554; see United States v. Morris, 448 F.3d 929, 932 (6th Cir. 2006) (“This rebuttable
presumption does not relieve the district court of the obligation to consider other relevant statutory factors or
sufficiently articulate its reasoning so as to permit reasonable appellate review.”).
128. Vonner, 452 F.3d at 567-69.
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the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the advisory Guideline range, as well as the other factors listed in the 18
129
United States 3553(a).”

The circuit found the district court’s perfunctory analysis “unreasonable” and
therefore admonished: “This type of offhanded dismissal of a defendant’s claims
provides mere lip service to the district court’s responsibility to carefully weigh all the
facts and provide a defendant with a well-reasoned, well-thought-out sentencing
decision.”130 In short, it concluded, when a defendant has raised a specific argument or
consideration to be considered under the § 3553(a) factors, the sentencing court must
proffer an “adequate explanation” for its acceptance or rejection of those arguments.131
D. The Diminished Effect
This litany of Sixth Circuit cases illustrates several points. At a minimum, the
Sixth Circuit has attempted to bolster the continued reliance upon the Guidelines’
calculation with firm rhetoric, arguably establishing a measure of precedent and
assuring more consistent expectations of the standard of review for both defendants and
sentencing courts. And, although Booker and Blakely emphasized the constitutional
problem with construing the Guidelines as a mandatory sentencing system, the
aforementioned reactions by sentencing courts reflect that the Guidelines continue to
prevent those courts from balancing determinate and indeterminate sentencing
considerations.
As a first step, a sentencing court must still calculate the Guidelines precisely as
before, thereby engaging in substantial judicial fact-finding. If a pre-Booker sentencing
court was savvy enough to alternatively recommend an identical-to-the-Guidelines
shadow sentence, that sentence is readily affirmed. Additionally, any sentence within
the Guidelines range is afforded a presumption of reasonableness. Despite the Sixth
Circuit’s rhetorical efforts to imbue this presumption with requiring evidence of
discretionary language, the effect remains the same: the federal sentencing system
remains primarily a determinate scheme buttressed by heavy presumptions. This is
evident in post-Booker statistics. According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s postBooker report, “only one circuit court has held a properly calculated guideline sentence
to be unreasonable,”132 and “[n]o circuit court has upheld a below-range sentence
granted on the basis of either a prohibited factor or the defendant’s cooperation without
a government motion having been filed.”133
Put simply, the judicial response to Booker has slowed any movement toward a
more balanced determinate/ indeterminate sentencing system and has instead redirected
sentencing courts to rely on the applicable advisory Guidelines’ range. Although
notable commentaries have approved of continuing to afford the advisory Guidelines’

129. Id. at 568.
130. Id. (citing McBride, 434 F.3d at 476 n.3).
131. Id. at 569.
132. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 71, at 35 (citing United States v. Lazenby,
439 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2006)).
133. Id.
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range a substantial amount of weight in sentencing determinations,134 even those
commentaries have lamented the inherent danger in such presumptive weight: the
abdication of the exercise of meaningful independent judgment in favor of a predetermined calculation.135
With this conundrum in mind, Part III of this paper provides an overview of
Maine’s criminal sentencing scheme both before and after Booker via the example of
the well-publicized case, State v. Schofield.136
III.
Like the federal system, Maine’s pre-Blakely/Booker sentencing procedure
presented a dilemma identical in almost every material respect to that presented by the
Guidelines. Indeed, before the pronouncement of the Blakely and Booker decisions,
Maine’s sentencing scheme frequently obligated sentencing judges to determine, by a
preponderance of the evidence, whether a defendant’s conduct was sufficiently heinous
to merit an enhanced sentence. That is, however, the only similarity between the two
sentencing systems. As detailed below, Maine’s response to the Supreme Court’s
landmark decisions reflects a common sense approach that carefully balances several
statutorily enumerated sentencing goals while simultaneously affording much-needed
discretion to sentencing judges. In doing so, Maine appropriately moved toward a more
balanced determinate/ indeterminate scheme which, unlike the current federal approach,
serves to adequately individualize each defendant’s sentence.
A. Maine’s Statutory Sentencing Framework
In 1976, Maine adopted its Criminal Code and thereby eliminated indeterminate
sentences by establishing a three-part procedure for sentencing criminal defendants.137
Specifically, the three-part sentencing procedure first required a court to set the basic
term of imprisonment “by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the
offense as committed by the offender.”138 Secondly, a sentencing court had to
“determine the maximum period of imprisonment to be imposed by considering all
other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to that
case.”139 “Mitigating factors may include those that demonstrate a low potential of
reoffending, and aggravating factors may include those that demonstrate a high
probability of reoffending.”140 During this second step, “the court [had to] apply its
discretion to determine the degree of mitigation called for by the circumstances of the
134. For one such judicial commentary, see United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 735-41 (6th Cir.
2006) (Sutton, J., concurring).
135. See id. at 740. (“If I have one anxiety about the presumption, it is the risk that it will cast a
discouraging shadow on trial judges who otherwise would grant variances in exercising their independent
judgment.”).
136. 2005 ME 82, ¶ 16, 895 A.2d 927.
137. State v. Lewis, 590 A.2d 149, 150 (Me. 1991).
138. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252-C(1) (2004); see State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154 (Me.
1993) (noting the trial court must consider, at step one, “‘the particular nature and seriousness of the offense
without regard to the circumstances of the offender’” (quoting State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me.
1991))).
139. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252-C(2) (2004).
140. State v. Gray, 2006 ME 29, ¶ 13, 893 A.2d 611, 616 (citing Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1154).
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offender and the degree of aggravation indicated by specific factors demonstrating a
high risk of re-offending.”141 Doing so enabled the court to “appropriately
individualize each sentence.”142
Finally, at step three, a sentencing court analyzed whether any portion “of the
maximum period of imprisonment should be suspended and, if a suspension order is to
be entered, determine the appropriate period of probation to accompany that
suspension.”143 At this third step, “the court [could] suspend a portion of the period of
maximum incarceration when, for example, the court determines that society will better
be protected by affording a period of supervised probation of an offender.”144 Not
unlike its federal counterpart,145 any Maine sentence was additionally guided by the
following statutorily enumerated “purposes”:

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

1.

To prevent crime through the deterrent effect of sentences, the
rehabilitation of convicted persons, and the restraint of convicted persons
when required in the interest of public safety;

2.

To encourage restitution in all cases in which the victim can be
compensated and other purposes of sentencing can be appropriately served;

3.

To minimize correctional experiences which serve to promote further
criminality;

4.

To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on
the conviction of a crime;

5.

To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate
criminological goals;

6.

To encourage differentiation among offenders with a view to a just
individualization of sentences;

7.

To promote the development of correctional programs which elicit the
cooperation of convicted persons; and

8.

To permit sentences that do not diminish the gravity of offenses, with
reference to the factors, among others, of:

State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me. 1991).
Id.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252-C(3) (2004).
Hewey, 622 A.2d at 1155.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000).
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A.

The age of the victim; and

B.

The selection by the defendant of the person against whom the
crime was committed or of the property that was damaged or
otherwise affected by the crime because of the race, color,
religion, sex, ancestry, national origin, physical or mental
disability or sexual orientation of that person or of the owner or
146
occupant of that property.

The Maine Criminal Code also established corresponding maximum periods of
imprisonment for each class of crime. Specifically, Maine’s Criminal Code set the
maximum term of imprisonment for serious crimes, other than murder,147 and
categorized them into Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E.148 Years later,
in 1988, a divided Judiciary Committee proposed that the punishment solely for Class A
crimes be doubled.149 The Committee, however, specified that their proposal would not
apply to all Class A crimes; instead, the amendment would apply only to those
defendants receiving close-to-maximum sentences for “‘the most heinous and violent
crimes that are committed against a person.’”150 Following the bill’s approval, enacted
at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A), the maximum sentence for Class A crimes was
increased from twenty to forty years.151
B. Heading toward a Booker problem: The promulgation of Maine’s two-tier
sentencing for “the most heinous and violent crimes”
Following the promulgation of section 1252(2)(A), the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court (“SJC”) concluded, in State v. Lewis,152 that “the [Legislature’s] intent was to
make available two discrete ranges of sentences for Class A crimes.”153 Thus,
ordinarily, a defendant who committed a Class A crime would receive a sentence below
twenty years.154 Consistent with the language embodied by the 1988 sentencing
amendment, however, a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s
crime constituted one of “the most heinous and violent crimes committed against a

146. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151 (2004).
147. Murder is a class of crime unto itself, carrying a minimum sentence of twenty-five years and a
maximum sentence of life in prison. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1251 (2004).
148. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252 (2004). Under the current law, a defendant who commits a
“Class A” crime may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment “not to exceed 30 years.” § 1252(2)(A).
Correspondingly, “[i]n the case of a Class B crime, the court shall set a definite period not to exceed 10
years.” § 1252(2)(B). A “Class C” crime is punishable by a definite period of imprisonment “not to exceed 5
years.” § 1252(2)(C). A “Class D” crime is punishable by a period of “less than one year” while a “Class E”
crime is punishable by a period of imprisonment “not to exceed 6 months.” §§ 1252(2)(D)-(E). As discussed
more fully below, this Paper focuses on section 1252(2)(A) as written before the legislature’s most recent
2004 amendment.
149. Lewis, 590 A.2d at 151.
150. Id. (quoting Com. Amend. A to L.D. 2312, No. H-720 (113th Legis. 1988)).
151. 1987 Me. Laws 1834 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1252(2)(A), 1252-B (Supp.
1990)).
152. 590 A.2d 149 (Me. 1991).
153. Lewis, 590 A.2d at 151. Following the issuance of Lewis, the Legislature amended section
1252(2)(A) to incorporate the two-tier approach. 1995 Me. Laws 956-57, § 1 (effective Sept. 29, 1995).
154. Lewis, 590 A.2d at 151.
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person” would enable the sentencing court to “in its discretion consider imposing a
basic sentence within the expanded range of twenty to forty years.”155 Significantly, a
trial court was tasked with determining whether a defendant’s crime merited an uppertier sentence at the first step of the sentencing process (i.e. when setting the basic term
of imprisonment.)156 As a result, “[c]ircumstances of the offender, or other
circumstances unrelated to the nature and seriousness of the offense, [could not] elevate
the maximum period of incarceration beyond twenty years when the crime itself is not
within the extended range of Class A crimes.”157 Indeed, as noted, only at step two was
a court permitted to consider the factors peculiar to the offending defendant.158
With that structure in mind, sentencing judges were frequently required to make
findings at step one to determine in which “zone” a Class A offender should be
sentenced.159 To determine whether a particular defendant’s conduct was sufficiently
“heinous” to merit an upper-tier penalty, a sentencing court was instructed to compare
the commission of that defendant’s act to “all of the possible means of committing the
offenses on a scale reflecting degrees of seriousness....”160 If “defendant’s conduct
would cause his offenses to rank high on that scale[,]” then a sentence in the upper
quadrant of the sentencing range was appropriate.161 A sentencing court was invited to
consider facts outside the record and,162 most importantly, whether the commission of

155. Id.; State v. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 16, 895 A.2d 927, 932 (noting utility of the preponderance of
the evidence standard in sentencing).
156. State v. Roberts, 641 A.2d 177, 179 n.3 (Me. 1994) (“Inherent in determining the basic period of
incarceration for a Class A offense is establishing whether the statutory maximum sentence that can be
imposed for that offense is twenty years or the extended range of forty years, and fixing the basic period of
incarceration within that limit.”) (citing State v. Shackelford, 634 A.2d 1292, 1295 (Me. 1993)); see State v.
Cobb, 2006 ME 43, ¶ 11 n.7, 895 A.2d 972, 976 (observing that the trial court should “have determined
whether it would be considering a sentence in the upper tier before beginning the three-part Hewey analysis”).
157. State v. Hawkins, 633 A.2d 78, 79 (Me. 1993) (emphasis added).
158. State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154 (Me. 1993).
159. E.g., State v. Carr, 1998 ME 237, ¶ 5, 719 A.2d 531, 533 (“For Class A crimes, the trial court must
also decide whether the basic period of incarceration is within two discrete zones–the extended forty-year
range, pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A), or the usual twenty-year range.”) (citing Lewis, 590 A.2d at
151).
160. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1990); see State v. Corbett, 618 A.2d 222, 223 (Me.
1992) (“In evaluating the nature and seriousness of the offense we place the criminal conduct on a continuum
for each type of offense ‘to determine which act justifies the imposition of the most extreme punishment.’”
(quoting State v. St. Pierre, 584 A.2d 618, 621 (Me. 1990))); State v. Lilley, 624 A.2d 935, 937 (Me. 1993)
(“A comparison of this case with other recent cases supports our conclusion that defendant’s sentence resulted
from an error in principle and that the suspended portion of defendant’s final sentence is disproportionate to
sentences for comparable offenders.”). Given the high standard of appellate review for sentences, the
importance of the sentencing court’s determination cannot be overstated. See State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105,
1106 (Me. 1991) (“[W]e accord the sentencing court great deference in weighing these [aggravating and
mitigating] factors in order that it may appropriately individualize each sentence.”); accord State v. Tapley,
609 A.2d 722, 723 (Me. 1992) (observing that the sentencing court receives “great deference” in weighing the
sentencing factors).
161. Hallowell, 577 A.2d at 781. Compare State v. Kehling, 601 A.2d 620, 624 (Me. 1991) (“The nature
of the crime committed by defendant Kehling in setting an apartment house afire in the early morning hours
was sufficiently heinous and violent to justify the imposition of a basic sentence at the top of the upper range
recognized by Lewis.”), with State v. Corbett, 618 A.2d 222, 224-25 (Me. 1992) (reversing defendant’s
elevated sentence because although she sold one and one-half grams of cocaine near school grounds, “the
sales occurred after school hours and minors were not involved”).
162. State v. Gallant, 600 A.2d 830, 832 (Me. 1991) (“In making its sentencing decision, the court is not
limited to facts found at trial.”) (citing State v. Dumont, 507 A.2d 164, 166 (Me. 1986)). Indeed, as the
Gallant court indicated, “[t]he facts contained in a presentence report may properly influence the court’s
sentence if the defendant has the opportunity to challenge the report.” Id.
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defendant’s crime was accompanied by extreme violence or serious physical injury.163
Notably, however, a non-violent crime could qualify for an extended sentence so long
as it was sufficiently heinous.164 The defendant, who possesses a litany of prior
convictions, could likewise receive an enhanced sentence.165
With the foregoing principles in mind, the SJC has affirmed sentences in the uppertier imposed upon defendants who (1) savagely attacked the victim with a knife and
subsequently left the victim to die in the woods;166 (2) for two years, used alcohol,
drugs, gifts, money, and pornography to lure and groom thirteen and fourteen-year-old
boys into sexual relationships;167 and (3) possessed a criminal history including killing
a prison inmate, injuring a prison guard, and stabbing five people during a prison
riot.168 Conversely, the court viewed close-to maximum sentences to be inappropriate
for (1) sexual assaults “in cases that involve neither a weapon, nor a heightened degree
of violence, injury, torture, or depravity[;]”169 (2) arson committed without any
apparent motive,170 and (3) drug sales.171
163. State v. Clark, 591 A.2d 462, 464-65 (Me. 1991) (“The upper quadrant of the sentencing range is
reserved for offenses that are accomplished, for example, with extreme violence and accompanied by serious
physical injury.”).
164. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 18, 745 A.2d 368, 373-74. In rejecting the theory that only violent
crimes could qualify for an upper-tier sentence, the court stated as follows:
We next address the defendants’ contention that the court engaged in a misapplication of principle
when it found that the sentences met the criteria for the upper tier. Primarily, Sweet and Poulin
argue that their conduct leading to the gross sexual assault charges was not violent, and therefore
enhanced sentences were inappropriate. They are correct that their conduct did not include forced,
precipitously violent, or injury-producing conduct. Rather, their method of obtaining victims had
as its center point coercion, not physical violence. Stripped to its essence, their goal was to create
willing and eager sexual partners of children. By their actions, they exposed their victims to an
environment of sex, alcohol, and pornography. They undertook these actions with boys whose
ages placed them at the cusp of sexual development. Their actions in this regard may well have
created greater long-term damage to their victims than a violent one-time assault could have done.
In addition, the young victims were subjected to anal penetration, attempted penetration, and a
variety of other physically intrusive sexual activities. We conclude, as did the sentencing court,
that such conduct is sufficiently heinous that the absence of precipitous violence does not preclude
a sentence in the upper tier.
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
165. State v. Cobb, 2006 ME 43, ¶ 22, 895 A.2d 972, 978 (“[T]he elevation into the upper tier does not
require submission to a jury if it is based solely on prior convictions.”). This Paper notes the inclusion of this
category solely for the sake of completeness. Given that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), excepts “the fact of a prior conviction” from the general rule that
sentencing-enhancing facts must be found by a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the discussion
below will not revisit the impact of prior convictions on a defendant’s sentence. E.g., United States v. Poole,
407 F.3d 767, 777 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Booker’s holding, that the Sixth Amendment bars mandatory
enhancements based on judicial fact-finding, does not apply to the ‘fact of a prior conviction.’”).
166. State v. Cooper, 617 A.2d 1011, 1016 (Me. 1992) (noting that the trial court, in enhancing
defendant’s sentence, emphasized “the savage and brutal nature of the attack and the fact that Cooper left the
victim to die in the woods where his open wounds became infested with maggots”).
167. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, at ¶ 18, 745 A.2d at 373-74.
168. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (noting Paper will not discuss impact of a defendant’s
criminal history on his or her sentence).
169. Clark, 591 A.2d at 464.
170. State v. Cloutier, 646 A.2d 358, 361 (Me. 1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Berube,
1997 ME 165, ¶ 19, 698 A.2d 509, 515 (Me. 1997):
None of the arsons committed in this case, even taking into account that those committed on June
14 were successive fires that affected the ability of the fire departments to combat each separate
fire, greatly increasing the risk of death and destruction for each fire set, were committed against a
person so as to justify basic periods of incarceration in excess of twenty years.
171. E.g., State v. Babbitt, 658 A.2d 651, 654 (Me. 1995) (“The drug sales involved in this case, although
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C. Confronting Booker: The impact of State v. Schofield
Maine’s upper/ lower tier sentencing scheme was dramatically reformed in State v.
Schofield.172 The court’s opinion in Schofield, which followed the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Blakely and Booker, addressed the constitutionality of a sentencing judge’s
statutory power to determine, pursuant to section 1252(2)(A), whether a particular
defendant’s conduct was sufficiently “heinous” to merit an upper-tier penalty.173 In
addition to being a watershed case from a legal perspective, the unique facts giving rise
to Sally Schofield’s criminal prosecution, recounted below, sparked an unprecedented
amount of media coverage.174
Defendant Sally Schofield worked as a caseworker in Maine’s Department of
Human Services (“DHS”) from the early 1990s until November of 2000.175 As
Schofield discharged her responsibilities as a DHS caseworker in 1996, Christy Marr
gave birth to her troubled daughter, Logan.176 Christy, then a teenaged mother,
immediately had difficulty raising Logan and, as a result, Christy moved in with her
mother.177 Her mother, however, had doubts about Christy’s maturity and overall
ability to effectively parent Logan.178 Christy’s mother called DHS to report her
concern; DHS records reflect her initial concern that “Christy can’t or won’t put
Logan’s needs before her own. [Christy’s mother] said that Christy screams and hollers
at the baby all the time and handles her extremely roughly.”179 Those concerns
culminated in the removal, by DHS, of then two-and-a-half-year-old Logan into state
custody from Christy while she was pregnant with her second child.180
After the birth of her new baby girl, Bailey, Christy temporarily revamped her life
serious offenses, cannot be classified as crimes of violence.”); State v. Hawkins, 633 A.2d 78, 80 (Me. 1993)
(“The drug sales involved here, although serious, cannot be classified as crimes of violence by any rational
interpretation of legislative intent.”).
172. 2005 ME 82, 895 A.2d 927 (Me. 2005).
173. Id.
174. The articles covering the complex factual and procedural history of this case are far too many to
mention. For a representative sample, see Virginia Heffernan, Good Intentions in Maine Leave a Girl Dead
and a Mother in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at E5; Meadow Rue Merrill, Foster Child’s Death Raises
Questions in Maine, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2001, at B1; Associated Press, Foster Child’s Death in Maine
Prompts Scrutiny of System by State Lawmakers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 29, 2001, at A16. The
public’s fascination with the Schofield case culminated with a PBS special dedicated to examining the life of
the victim, Logan Marr, and the bureaucracy that led to her death. Frontline: Failure to Protect (PBS
television broadcast Jan. 30, 2003). Schofield’s name remains in the public eye given her decision to again
challenge her sentence. E.g., Gregory D. Kesich, Justices to Gauge Child-Killer’s Sentence, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, June 3, 2006, at B1; Gary Remal, Court to Review Schofield Case Again, KENNEBEC
JOURNAL, May 25, 2006, http://kennebecjournal.mainetoday.com/news/local/2768281.shtml.
175. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 38, 95 A.2d at 929. The unique facts of State v. Schofield prompted awardwinning journalist Terrilyn Simpson to exhaustively document the events leading up to, and including,
Schofield’s trial. Using an independent newspaper to tell Schofield’s story, Simpson dedicated twenty-eight
pages to chronicling the tragic events preceding Logan Marr’s death. Terrilyn Simpson, Logan’s Truth,
COMMON SENSE INDEP., Oct. 2002, available at http://www.asmainegoes.com/loganstruth.htm#Down
[hereinafter Logan’s Truth]. Given the majority opinion’s decision to include few facts giving rise to the
Schofield case, this Paper periodically references Simpson’s work and the PBS Frontline special for
background details.
176. Frontline: Failure to Protect – The Taking of Logan Marr, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/fostercare/marr/ (last visited July 14, 2006) [hereinafter Frontline].
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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and persuaded DHS of her fitness as a mother to care for both Logan and Bailey.181
Her ability to care for Logan and Bailey, however, did not last; both children were
removed from Christy’s care because, according to DHS, Christy became romantically
involved with an accused sex offender who allegedly hit Christy in front of Logan.182
DHS, therefore, again removed Logan into state custody, this time with Bailey, and
placed the pair in the care of their second foster mother.183 Almost immediately after
her second placement in foster care, Logan began acting out by throwing angry tempertantrums, which often included physical outrages.184
Commensurate with the foster mother’s struggles with Logan’s behavior,
Schofield, who was still employed by DHS, began to consider adopting a female child
of her own.185 Although Schofield had two boys of her own, and DHS discouraged its
caseworkers from adopting children from within the system, Schofield nonetheless
obtained custody over Logan and Bailey in September of 2000.186 Only a few short
months after her placement with Schofield, Logan began exhibiting intensely verbal and
physical outrages similar to those she displayed with her previous foster mother.187 As
Logan’s outbursts further intensified,188 Schofield began invoking “progressively
longer time-out periods, which often involved covering Logan with a blanket, or lying
on top of her while bargaining with Logan for the release of one limb at a time.”189
The struggle between Schofield and Logan ended with Logan’s death on January
31, 2001, as a snowstorm raged outside.190 At home on that afternoon, Logan’s
behavior intensified to such an extent that Schofield took Logan down the basement
stairs where Schofield placed five-year-old Logan in a high chair behind a blanket
curtain facing a concrete wall.191 Schofield then returned upstairs ostensibly to cook
dinner.192 A subsequent investigation of what soon became a crime scene revealed that
Schofield did not simply leave Logan in her high chair; instead, as the sentencing court
recounted:
[Schofield] secured Logan to the high chair by wrapping layers of duct tape around
Logan’s torso and behind the back of the chair to prevent her from getting out. To
silence her screams she wrapped more duct tape under her chin, over her head and
across her mouth. Having already violated the [Department] rules of discipline by

181. Frontline, supra note 173.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Frontline, supra note 173. Schofield ultimately quit her job at DHS in January 2001. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id. PBS articulately described this period of Schofield’s relationship with Logan as follows:
As Logan’s behavior deteriorated, Sally found herself at a loss. Logan would rage out of control,
screaming, kicking, and thrashing so violently that Sally was afraid she would hurt herself.
Suddenly, all the confidence Sally had accumulated as a parent and a DHS caseworker seemed to
vanish. “I was supposed to be trained,” she told FRONTLINE. “I was supposed to be educated.
How come I couldn’t help her? How come I didn’t know what to do?”
Frontline, supra note 173.
189. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 3, 895 A.2d at 929.
190. Logan’s Truth, supra note 172, at 20.
191. Id. at 22.
192. Id.
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physical confinement, Ms. Schofield then left Logan to struggle against her bonds in
193
isolation.

All told, Schofield wrapped forty-two feet of duct tape over Logan’s mouth and upper
lip.194 Shortly after Logan’s screams went silent, Schofield went to the basement to
check on Logan, after which she called 9-1-1.195 Although Logan was rushed to the
hospital, she was pronounced dead soon thereafter.196
That night, the police interviewed Schofield, who claimed that Logan was not
restrained in her high chair.197 Detectives, however, uncovered evidence to the contrary
when searching Schofield’s home; indeed, they recovered the duct tape which Schofield
removed prior to the arrival of medical personnel.198 Forensic tests then confirmed that
“three layers of tape had been placed over Logan’s mouth and upper lip, as evidenced
by a bloody froth from Logan’s congested lungs, with a DNA match to Logan, and tiny
mustache hairs directly above the bloody stain....”199 Although, after police confronted
Schofield with this new evidence, she initially claimed that Logan tangled herself in the
duct tape,200 her story ultimately crumbled and she was indicted for depraved
indifference murder in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(B), and manslaughter in
violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203(1)(A).201
Although, during Schofield’s jury-waived trial held in June of 2002, the trial court
granted her motion for acquittal on the charge of depraved indifference murder, the
court ultimately found Schofield guilty of manslaughter.202 At her subsequent
sentencing hearing, the court imposed upon Schofield a sentence in excess of twenty
years pursuant to section 1252(2)(A) because, the court found, Schofield’s crime was
sufficiently “heinous” to merit an upper-tier sentence. The court stated:
It became a test of wills between Logan and Sally, and Sally Schofield was
determined to win out. She couldn’t accept the fact that a five-year-old Logan might
get the best of her. And yet despite all of her training and all of her experience and

193. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 4, 895 A.2d at 929.
194. Logan’s Truth, supra note 172, at 22. Terrilyn Simpson described the events that followed the
authorities’ arrival at Schofield’s home as follows:
Wearing a pink jersey and a light-colored pair of overalls, Logan’s face was pale. Barefooted, one
of her toes was bleeding, suggesting she’d struck it against the concrete wall she’d been left facing
from the high chair although [investigator] Mills had no way of knowing that.
When a firefighter arrived as part of the rescue response, Mills carried Logan upstairs. She’d wet
herself. Mills said the child vomited over his shoulder; the coroner later explained the incident as
“postmortem regurgitation” and explained that “when people die,” they also frequently lose bowel
and bladder control.
Id. at 23.
195. Id. at 22. Schofield’s teenage son testified at trial that his mother actually made two trips up the
basement stairs; the first, prosecutors believed, was to get a tool to cut the duct tape and the second, as
discussed above, was to call 9-1-1. Id. at 22-23. Prosecutors further theorized that Schofield was not simply
trying to save Logan, but instead was “desperate” to remove the duct tape before calling 9-1-1. Id. at 23.
196. Frontline, supra note 173.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Logan’s Truth, supra note 172, at 22.
200. Frontline, supra note 173.
201. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 5, 895 A.2d at 929.
202. Id.
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knowledge of children in foster care and her awareness of the rules and regulations,
she acted recklessly when she restrained Logan in the basement to fight her bonds in
solitude and silence.

The situation developed over time, and the conduct leading to the actual death,
however, did not happen in a momentary lapse. The defendant’s conduct in
restraining Logan recklessly led to her death. At any time during the process of
restraining her she could’ve closed the door instead of putting the gag around her.
She could’ve turned up the radio if she wanted to drown out the sounds of Logan
making noise and yelling. Putting her in restraints was against the rules and
regulations of the placement. But even if she had done that, by placing the duct tape
around the head and as was disclosed-described as clamping her mouth shut, Logan
had no chance.

This case is most serious, and the Court believes that the base sentence in this case
falls in the 20 to 25-year range. With the enhancement called for in the death of a
203
child under the age of six, the Court fixes the base sentence at 28 years.

In the next steps of the sentencing process, the court declined to make any
adjustment to the base sentence and thereafter (1) suspended eight years of the twentyeight-year sentence;204 and (2) ordered Schofield to serve six years of probation
following the completion of her prison term.205 The SJC granted Schofield leave to
appeal her sentence.206
On appeal, the SJC considered, in pertinent part, whether an upper-tier sentence
determination must be made by a jury. After reviewing both the Blakely and Booker
decisions, the court held that section 1252(2)(A) could not be constitutionally applied to
Schofield’s sentencing. In the critical portion of its analysis, the court stated as follows:
As we have already noted, section 1252(2)(A) required a finding that Schofield’s
crime was “among the most heinous crimes committed against a person” before a
sentence exceeding twenty years could be imposed. That fact was not pleaded in
Schofield’s indictment as an element of the offense of manslaughter, was not
admitted by Schofield, and was not determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the
fact-finder. For these reasons, section 1252(2)(A) cannot be constitutionally applied
without affording the defendant an opportunity to have the fact-finder of her choice,
judge or jury, determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the crime was among
207
the most heinous offenses committed against a person.

203. Id. at ¶ 7, 895 A.2d at 930.
204. Maine does not have a parole system. Instead, sentences of imprisonment can be ordered to be fully
served in incarceration, can be wholly suspended with probation, or can be split, with an unsuspended portion
of the sentence to be served in incarceration, followed by a period of probation. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1152(2) (2004).
205. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 8, 895 A.2d at 930.
206. Id. at ¶ 10, 895 A.2d at 930.
207. Id. at ¶ 21, 895 A.2d at 933.
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In thereafter approving of the use of “jury sentencing” to determine any fact necessary
to enhance Schofield’s sentence, the court vacated her original sentence and remanded
with instructions for the sentencing court to provide Schofield with “the opportunity for
a sentencing trial before the fact-finder of her choice (i.e., judge or jury).”208 The court
concluded by observing that, on remand, Schofield’s sentence may properly be
enhanced only if her chosen fact-finder determines beyond a reasonable doubt that
Schofield’s offense is among the most heinous committed against a person.209
D. Sentencing after Schofield
Although the court’s holding in Schofield undoubtedly affected defendants whose
sentences were enhanced pursuant to the two-tier system,210 its impact was significantly
limited by the legislature’s preemptive amendment to section 1252(2)(A) in 2004.211
At that time, the legislature revised the language of section 1252(2)(A) to read that,
“[i]n the case of a Class A crime, the court shall set a definite period not to exceed 30
years.”212 “This legislation indicated in its statement of fact that it was designed to
eliminate a ‘constitutional cloud’ created by Apprendi by eliminating what it
characterized as the two-tier system and replacing it with ‘a single 0- to 30-year
range.’”213 Quite evidently ahead of its time, that amendment enabled the legislature to
cut off the potential flood of defendants impacted by Schofield by wholly eliminating
the two “zones” of sentencing and replacing it with a 0-30 year range.
Thus, were Schofield sentenced today, the sentencing court would be confined
simply to the 0-30 range provided by revised section 1252(2)(A). To reach an
appropriate sentence for Schofield, the court would continue to follow the three-step
Hewey analysis. Accordingly, the court would (1) set a basic term of imprisonment; (2)
consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and (3) determine whether any

208. Id. at ¶ 40, 895 A.2d at 938. Notably, the court subsequently altered a portion of this paragraph. In
this paragraph, the court initially outlined a jury instruction, which the trial judge was directed to read to the
jury in the event that Schofield, in fact, elected a jury to determine the facts necessary to impose an enhanced
sentence. Id. In State v. Averill, 2005 ME 83, 887 A.2d 519, however, the court modified a portion of the
jury instruction. That modification is not relevant to this Paper.
209. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 41, 895 A.2d at 938.
210. E.g., State v. Averill, 2005 ME 83, 887 A.2d 519. At the outset, it bears noting that the same citation
to Averill reveals two separate opinions, the most recent of which merely revises a portion of Schofield. See
supra note 205, and accompanying text. The substantive Averill opinion reflects that the sentencing court
determined that the manner in which defendant committed the sexual assault for which he was found guilty
comprised one of the most heinous ways such an act could occur. Id. at ¶ 4, 887 A.2d at 521. The sentencing
court therefore concluded that an upper-tier sentence was appropriate. Id. After appealing his sentence,
Averill contended that “he was entitled to have the issue of heinousness presented to the jury and was denied
his Sixth Amendment rights when a sentence in excess of twenty years was imposed without his being given
the opportunity to have a jury make that determination.” Id. at ¶ 7, 887 A.2d at 521. Citing Schofield, the
SJC agreed with Averill’s arguments and, accordingly, remanded for resentencing. Id. at ¶ 9, 887 A.2d at
521-22. In doing so, the court noted that although Averill could constitutionally be sentenced without further
fact-finding to a sentence of twenty-years or less, “[a] sentencing trial is required if the State recommends,
and/or the court is inclined to impose, a sentence in excess of twenty years based on heinousness.” Id. at ¶ 10,
887 A.2d at 522; cf. State v. Miller, 2005 ME 84, 875 A.2d 694 (holding no constitutional problem arose from
judicial fact-finding in discretionary sentencing under distinct statutory provision).
211. 2003 Me. Legis. Serv. 2083, § 10 (West) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 17-A § 1252(2)(A)
(2004)).
212. ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(A) (2004).
213. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶ 9 n.4, 895 A.2d at 930 n.4 (quoting L.D. 1844 Statement of Fact (121st
Legis. 2004)).
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portion of the sentence should be suspended. By providing such a procedure, Maine has
sought to protect the legislature’s interest in reducing sentencing disparity at step one
(i.e., by mandating a specific sentencing range for a particular class of crime), while
simultaneously ensuring that each defendant will receive the benefit of genuine judicial
discretion at step two.
IV.
Notwithstanding its complexity, the Maine sentencing system provides what is, in
essence, a three-step checklist for the sentencing court to follow. Built into that list is,
of course, a variety of statutorily enumerated sentencing purposes. Accordingly, the
sentencing judge who closely adheres to each step appropriately individualizes each
defendant’s punishment while simultaneously seeking to achieve uniformity in
sentencing. The ultimate sentence therefore reflects a balance of determinate and
indeterminate components. Importantly, in Maine, uniformity does not trump
individualization; so long as the requisite “checklist” is adhered to, sentencing courts in
Maine retain substantial discretion to tailor the sentence to the individual defendant. As
a result, a properly imposed sentence in Maine is met with extraordinary deference,
thereby conserving judicial resources.
Admittedly, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were initially drafted to accomplish
nearly identical goals. Indeed, at the outset of their promulgation, the Guidelines were
designed to provide district courts with at least some limited discretion. Under the
guise of seeking to avoid inequality in sentencing, however, the federal appellate
judiciary’s application and interpretation of the Guidelines has slowly divested
whatever remaining discretion sentencing courts possessed when imposing a sentence
pursuant to the Guidelines. Indeed, after Booker, sentencing courts are tacitly charged
with adhering to the recommended Guidelines range or risk reversal. The result, as
documented in Part II by reference to opinions authored by the Sixth Circuit, reflects a
gradual shift toward a sentencing regime dedicated almost exclusively to determinate
sentencing.
The merits of a determinate, as opposed to an indeterminate, sentencing system,
have long been debated.214 In sum, those who advocate in favor of determinate
sentencing contend that it provides equality in punishment while simultaneously
limiting the unpredictable application of judicial discretion.215 Conversely, proponents
of indeterminate sentencing highlight that equitable punishments arise not from acrossthe-board mandatory sentences, but rather from the uniform application of certain
sentencing principles.216 Although patently divergent, the foregoing arguments reflect
one glaring similarity: regardless of whether one favors indeterminate or determinate
sentencing, both camps seek to avoid an unwarranted disparity in sentencing. This
Article has not sought to advocate on behalf of either indeterminate or determinate
sentencing but, instead, has assumed that the ultimate goal of any sentencing scheme is
214. E.g., Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. 1, 8 (1993)
(outlining the general arguments in favor of, and against, determinate and indeterminate sentencing).
215. See Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences of African American Women in
Crime and Sentencing, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 37 (1995).
216. E.g., Daniel Weiss, California’s Inequitable Parole System: A Proposal to Reestablish Fairness, 78
S. CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1583 n.79 (2005).
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to avoid inequitable sentencing.
To that end, a comprehensive examination of the history of federal sentencing, as
well as an examination of its state counterparts, is needed. As discussed in Part II, the
Sixth Circuit’s various approaches to sentencing–the presumption of reasonableness,
shadow sentences, and judicial fact-finding for enhancements–serve merely to
unconstitutionally streamline federal sentencing procedures by distracting federal
judges from their duty to impose individualized sentences upon every defendant who
enters their courtroom. To worsen matters, whatever discretion remains is currently
being absorbed by the growing trend of appellate courts to reverse a sentencing court’s
decision to grant to defendants a downward departure.217 Thus, although the current
state of federal sentencing procedures outwardly purports to possess indeterminate and
determinate components, the practical reality of federal sentencing reflects an
unwavering addiction to the narrow ranges proscribed by the Guidelines.
In contrast, this Article has proffered that the combination of the Maine
legislature’s revision of the two-tiered approach previously endorsed by section
1252(2)(A) alongside the Sixth Amendment boundary imposed by the Schofield opinion
serve as an interesting window through which to view a proposed response to the
Supreme Court’s Blakely and Booker decisions. Notably, that response differs starkly
from that endorsed by the Sixth Circuit. Indeed, unlike the Sixth Circuit’s tacit return to
pre-Booker sentencing procedures, Maine’s mixed determinate/ indeterminate
sentencing system marks clear constitutional boundaries for sentencing judges while
simultaneously ensuring the individualization of each defendant’s sentence.
Further to blame is the federal judiciary’s current approach to reviewing sentences.
As noted, a circuit court typically reviews post-Booker sentences for
“reasonableness.”218 The “reasonableness” standard of review is at best confusing and,
at worst, an invitation to consider a panoply of additional, often pre-Booker,219
corresponding standards of review.220 Indeed, lying beneath the topical reasonableness
standard exist, for example, (1) a de novo approach to reviewing asserted errors in the
application of the Guidelines;221 (2) a clearly erroneous standard applicable to appellate

217. E.g., United States v. Brown, 453 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2006) (vacating below-guideline
sentence); United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1242 (11th Cir. 2006) (same). The recent numbers
published by the Sentencing Commission are nothing short of staggering. Indeed, only in 5.2% of cases are
defendants receiving a downward departure from their applicable advisory guidelines range. U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT: CASES SENTENCED SUBSEQUENT TO
U.S. V. BOOKER 16 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker_060106.pdf.
218. See supra text accompanying note 109.
219. See United States v. Robinson, 433 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2005) (observing that despite Booker’s
reasonableness standard, the court continues to review the district court’s interpretations of the legal meaning
of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error); United States v. Villegas, 404
F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that de novo standard still applies to determining whether the district
court correctly interpreted and applied the sentencing guidelines); United States v. Arnaout, 431 F.3d 994, 998
(7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e continue to review the district court’s factual findings at sentencing for clear error and
the application of those facts to the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.”).
220. Confusingly, at least one court views the reasonableness inquiry to involve asking whether the
district court abused its discretion in announcing sentence. See United States v. Pizano, 403 F.3d 991, 995
(8th Cir. 2005) (“To make the reasonableness determination, we ask whether the district court abused its
discretion.”).
221. United States v. Montanez, 442 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We review legal conclusions
regarding the application of Guideline provisions de novo.” (citing United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638,
640 (6th Cir. 2006)).
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challenges to a sentencing court’s imposition of an enhancement;222 and (3) a clearly
erroneous standard applicable to a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.223
Grounded in the notion that the sentencing court is better able to evaluate the
circumstances of each particular defendant,224 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
employs a far more workable, albeit complex, and deferential two-step standard when
reviewing sentences.225 Perhaps the best example of Maine’s deferential approach
exists at the outset; indeed, a three-justice panel of the Supreme Judicial Court must
first grant a defendant leave to review his or her sentence before the entire court will
consider any asserted error in sentencing.226 Assuming discretionary leave is
granted,227 the court reviews the lower court’s determination of the defendant’s basic
period of incarceration for “misapplication of principle.”228 In doing so, the court
accords “great deference” to (1) “the weight and effect given by the court to those
factors peculiar to a particular offender in its determination of the offender’s maximum
period of incarceration;” and (2) “the court’s determination whether to suspend any
portion of that maximum period in arriving at the final sentence imposed on the
offender by the court.”229 Accordingly, as the court stated in State v. Hewey:
Because of the two different standards applicable in our review of the sentencing
process, the desirability of a clear articulation by the trial court of its compliance with
the three-step procedure becomes apparent. This articulation will aid us not only in
distinguishing and applying the appropriate standard of appellate review, – i.e., the
misapplication of principle standard to a trial court’s determination of the basic
period of incarceration and a standard of considerable deference to its determinations
of the maximum period of incarceration and the final sentence–but it will also
230
facilitate a greater degree of uniformity in the sentencing process.

222. See supra text accompanying notes 94-102, the Davidson opinion appears particularly problematic in
light of Booker. Simply stated, the Davidson decision tacitly approves of the imposition of post-Booker
sentencing enhancements based neither on facts proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, nor admitted to
by the defendant. The utilization of the Davidson court’s “non-mandatory Guideline recommendation”
plainly departs from Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, regardless of the name assigned to describe the
Davidson decision’s analysis, the result creates a tenuous Booker loophole allowing the backdoor utilization
of unconstitutional judicial fact-finding to support sentencing enhancements.
223. United States v. Williams, 894 F.2d 208, 213 (6th Cir. 1990) (“We review the district court's
determination of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility under a clearly erroneous standard.” (citing
United States v. Wilson, 878 F.2d 921, 923 (6th Cir. 1989))). United States v. Lunsford, No. 95-1507, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 6552, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1996) (“Whether a defendant has accepted responsibility for
criminal conduct is a question of fact, and the district court’s determination on this issue will be disturbed
only if clearly erroneous.”).
224. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 15, 745 A.2d 368, 372-73 (noting that “the sentencing court is in a
better position to review aggravating and mitigating factors”).
225. See id. ¶¶ 10, 13, 745 A.2d at 372 (acknowledging that the sentencing process is complex and that the
sentencing court is tasked with attempting to accomplish several goals).
226. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2152 (2005).
227. See generally Daniel E. Wathen, Judges on Judging: Making Law the Old Fashioned Way–One
Case at a Time, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 619 (1991) (discussing the limited number of sentencing appeals
granted in Maine).
228. State v. Hallowell, 577 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1990) (“It is not enough that the members of this court
might have passed a different sentence, rather it is only when a sentence appears to err in principle that we
will alter it.”).
229. State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Me. 1993) (emphasis in original).
230. Id.(emphasis in original).
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Then, after determining that each individual step in the Hewey process was correctly
applied, the court reviews the sentence in its entirety for an abuse of discretion.231
No such process exists at the federal level. Consequently, the unfortunate likely
result of the federal judiciary’s erosion of the Booker ideals seems an unavoidable
return to the pre-Booker discontent recounted at the outset of this Article. Before that
happens, we should reconsider the role of Guidelines in federal sentencing, and the
Sentencing Commission would do well to examine the long history of sentencing in this
country, as well as evolution of sentencing in its state counterparts. Rather than
radically respond to the Booker decision by, for example, abolishing the Guidelines in
toto or, conversely, making them entirely mandatory,232 we should specifically consider
reevaluating the weight to be accorded the Guidelines when sentencing federal
defendants. We should correspondingly limit undue reliance on the Guidelines when
reviewing the actions of a sentencing court on appeal. The most immediate
consequence of such a proposal would, at a minimum, require appellate courts to
abandon the “presumption of reasonableness” already coveted by so many circuits.
Then, from a long-term perspective, the judiciary should consider gradually moving
toward a model not unlike Maine’s system. Doing so would, ironically, better suit the
original goals as outlined by the Sentencing Commission, better comport with the
historical evolution of sentencing in this country and, ultimately, achieve a more
reasonable balance between determinate and indeterminate sentencing.

231. State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 22, 745 A.2d 368, 375. Moreover, any appellate review must be
guided by (1) the opportunity to provide for the correction of sentences; (2) the need to promote respect for
the law; (3) the need to “facilitate the possible rehabilitation of an offender;” and (4) the chance to promote
the sentencing court’s adherence to applicable sentencing criteria. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2154
(2005).
232. One example is the so-called Sensenbrenner bill. Defending America’s Most Vulnerable: Safe
Access to Drug Treatment and Child Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 4547, 108th Cong. (2004). Although the
bill is purportedly a measure to promote drug treatment while protecting children, it actually includes
sweepingly harsh mandatory minimum sentences for a wide range of drug crimes. For example, the bill as
written would, inter alia, impose the following penalties: (1) a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence upon
a person older than twenty-one who sells any quantity of any controlled substance to a person younger than
eighteen; (2) a life sentence upon individuals twenty-one years or older who are convicted a second time of
distributing drugs to a person under eighteen; and (3) an increase of the federal mandatory minimum sentence
for the sale of any type of controlled substance within one thousand feet of a school, college, public library,
drug treatment facility, or private/ public daycare facilities, to five years.

